Month: December 2024

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Defense News: Harry S. Truman Strike Group Enters U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility

Source: United States Navy

MANAMA, Bahrain – The Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) entered the U.S. Central command area of responsibility, Dec 14.

The carrier strike group consists of the flagship Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75); Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 1 with nine embarked aviation squadrons; staffs from Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 8, CVW-1, and Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 28; the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64); and two Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, USS Stout (DDG 55) and USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109). 

The HSTCSG last deployed in the U.S. Central command area of responsibility in March 2020. 

The Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group is ready, if called upon, to execute the full spectrum of carrier operations essential to U.S. national security, including the defense of U.S. and partner forces and personnel and freedom of navigation to ensure maritime security and stability in the U.S. Central command area of responsibility. 

The U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations encompasses approximately 2.5 million square miles of water space and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, parts of the Indian Ocean and three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal and Strait of Bab al-Mandeb.

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Defense News: SECNAV Del Toro Names Future Guided Missile Frigate USS Joy Bright Hancock (FFG 69)

Source: United States Navy

NEWPORT, R.I. – Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro announced that a future Constellation-class Guided Missile Frigate, FFG 69, will be named USS Joy Bright Hancock, Dec. 16. 

Secretary Del Toro made the announcement at the 11th Women, Peace and Security Symposium, hosted by the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

The future USS Joy Bright Hancock honors her namesake’s trailblazing service beginning as a Yeoman in World War I, and her integral role in passage of the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act in 1948.  This will be the first U.S. Navy vessel named for Hancock.

“We—men and women alike—must contribute to the meaningful participation of women in the armed forces to increase combat readiness and operational effectiveness. Captain Joy Bright Hancock was a trailblazer who paved the way for generations of women to proudly serve this great Nation,” said Secretary Del Toro. “That is why, I am incredibly pleased to announce that a Constellation-class frigate, FFG 69, will be named the USS Joy Bright Hancock.”

The naming selection honors Captain Joy Bright Hancock (1898–1986). Born in New Jersey, Hancock received degrees from the George Washington University and the Crawford School of Foreign Service in Washington, DC; the Pierce School of Business Administration in Philadelphia; and the Paris Branch of the New York School of Fine Arts. 

During World War I, Hancock was a Yeoman (F) First Class on duty at the New York Shipbuilding Corporation in Camden, New Jersey. By then end of the war she was Chief Yeoman at the U.S. Naval Air Station in Cape May, New Jersey. Between 1934 and 1942 she was the civilian head of Editorial and Research Section of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics and the Special Assistant to the Bureau’s Chief. In the first year of World War II she was commissioned Lieutenant, Women’s Reserve, U.S. Naval Reserve, also known as WAVES. In February 1946 she became the director of WAVES and advanced through rank to Captain in the Naval Reserve by 26 July 1946. 

Captain Hancock, who was instrumental in the passage of the Women’s Armed Service Integration Act of 1948, was one of eight women to be sworn into the regular Navy and was subsequently appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Women. She retired from active duty in June 1953. During her long career, Captain Hancock received commendations for her service to the Bureau of Naval Aeronautics and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) during WWII, as well as for her assistance in expanding opportunities for women in the Navy. In recognition of her trailblazing career, the Navy now annually awards the Joy Bright Hancock Award to honor the visionary leadership of officers whose ideals foster an inclusive culture while furthering the integration of women in the Navy. There have been no previous Navy vessels named for Joy Bright Hancock.

The future USS Joy Bright Hancock will be the tenth of the new Constellation-class frigates. The other ships in the class are USS Constellation (FFG 62), USS Congress (FFG 63), USS Chesapeake (FFG 64), USS Lafayette (FFG 65), and USS Hamilton (FFG 66). Secretary Del Toro named the future USS Lafayette (FFG 65) in 2023, and the future USS Hamilton (FFG 66) and future USS Galvez (FFG 67) in 2024.  FFG 68 will be named in 2025.

The Constellation-class guided-missile frigate represents the Navy’s next generation small surface combatant. This ship class will be an agile, multi-mission warship, capable of operations in both blue-water and littoral environments, providing increased combat-credible forward presence that provides a military advantage at sea.

The Constellation-class will have multi-mission capability to conduct air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare, and information operations.

More information on guided missile frigates can be found here. 

Read Secretary Del Toro’s full remarks online. 

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OFAC-Sanctioned Afghan Man Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison for Narco-Terrorism and Witness Tampering

Source: United States Department of Justice Criminal Division

Haji Abdul Satar Abdul Manaf, 59, of Afghanistan, also known as Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai, was sentenced to 30 in prison for attempting to import heroin into the U.S., engaging in narco-terrorism for the benefit of the Taliban, attempting to engage in narco-terrorism for the benefit of the Haqqani Network, and witness tampering offenses. Manaf was convicted after a two-week jury trial that concluded in August.

According to court documents, evidence at trial, and statements made in public court proceedings, the Treasury Department sanctioned Manaf in June 2012, pursuant to the U.S.’ terrorism sanctions authority, Executive Order No. 13224, for storing or moving money for the Taliban. Upon announcing the sanctions against Manaf, the Treasury Department stated that Manaf “donated thousands of dollars to the Taliban to support Taliban activities in Afghanistan and has distributed funds to the Taliban” and provided money “to aid the Taliban’s fight against Coalition Forces.”   

Beginning in at least January 2018, Manaf attempted to import large quantities of heroin into the United Sates; paid benefits to the Taliban to support his heroin trafficking; and attempted to provide financial support to the Haqqani Network, a violent faction of the Taliban. Specifically, Manaf participated at in-person meetings, recorded telephone calls, and electronic communications with five individuals whom Manaf understood to be affiliated with an international drug trafficking organization. During those meetings, Manaf helped arrange to import large quantities of heroin into the U.S. with the assistance of — and recognizing that some of the proceeds of that narcotics trafficking would be provided to — the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. Four of these individuals were, in fact, DEA confidential sources. The fifth was an undercover DEA agent (the UC).

The Haqqani Network and the Taliban have committed highly public acts of terrorism against U.S. interests, including U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. In August 2018, Manaf sold the UC a ten-kilogram shipment of heroin in Afghanistan, after the UC told Manaf that the heroin would ultimately be imported into the United States for sale in New York. Manaf repeatedly told the UC that Manaf had paid the Taliban in connection with the production of the ten-kilo shipment and reported that heavily armed members of the Taliban would guard and transport future heroin shipments for Manaf and the UC. In August 2018, Manaf facilitated the transfer of thousands of dollars of what he believed to be narcotics proceeds through his money-remitting business to individuals Manaf had been advised were members of the Haqqani Network. Manaf subsequently agreed to supply the UC with thousand-kilogram loads of heroin for importation into the United States.

Following his arrest overseas and subsequent extradition, while incarcerated in New York pending trial in this case, Manaf directed members of his family in Afghanistan to kidnap and threaten a DEA source — a witness to his crimes — in an effort to silence him. Specifically, in a series of recorded prison calls in February and March 2019, Manaf directed his brothers to bring the source to Manaf’s family home, to “not let him go even for a minute,” to take the source’s phone, and to hand the source over to a “security chief” who would make the source “confess like a parrot” and “tell the whole story in two minutes.” Manaf’s brothers did just as he directed — they kidnapped that DEA source at gunpoint in Afghanistan and threatened to kill him.

In addition to the prison term, Manaf was sentenced to five years of supervised release and ordered to forfeit the proceeds of his crimes.

The DEA Special Operations Division’s Bilateral Investigations Unit; the DEA European Regional Director; the DEA Copenhagen, Canberra, Dubai, Islamabad, Kabul, New Delhi, and Sydney Country Offices; the Government of Estonia; and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission investigated the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sam Adelsberg, Nicholas S. Bradley, and Kimberly J. Ravener for the Southern District of New York are prosecuting the case with assistance from Trial Attorney Joshua Champagne of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section.

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Security News: OFAC-Sanctioned Afghan Man Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison for Narco-Terrorism and Witness Tampering

Source: United States Department of Justice 2

Haji Abdul Satar Abdul Manaf, 59, of Afghanistan, also known as Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai, was sentenced to 30 in prison for attempting to import heroin into the U.S., engaging in narco-terrorism for the benefit of the Taliban, attempting to engage in narco-terrorism for the benefit of the Haqqani Network, and witness tampering offenses. Manaf was convicted after a two-week jury trial that concluded in August.

According to court documents, evidence at trial, and statements made in public court proceedings, the Treasury Department sanctioned Manaf in June 2012, pursuant to the U.S.’ terrorism sanctions authority, Executive Order No. 13224, for storing or moving money for the Taliban. Upon announcing the sanctions against Manaf, the Treasury Department stated that Manaf “donated thousands of dollars to the Taliban to support Taliban activities in Afghanistan and has distributed funds to the Taliban” and provided money “to aid the Taliban’s fight against Coalition Forces.”   

Beginning in at least January 2018, Manaf attempted to import large quantities of heroin into the United Sates; paid benefits to the Taliban to support his heroin trafficking; and attempted to provide financial support to the Haqqani Network, a violent faction of the Taliban. Specifically, Manaf participated at in-person meetings, recorded telephone calls, and electronic communications with five individuals whom Manaf understood to be affiliated with an international drug trafficking organization. During those meetings, Manaf helped arrange to import large quantities of heroin into the U.S. with the assistance of — and recognizing that some of the proceeds of that narcotics trafficking would be provided to — the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. Four of these individuals were, in fact, DEA confidential sources. The fifth was an undercover DEA agent (the UC).

The Haqqani Network and the Taliban have committed highly public acts of terrorism against U.S. interests, including U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. In August 2018, Manaf sold the UC a ten-kilogram shipment of heroin in Afghanistan, after the UC told Manaf that the heroin would ultimately be imported into the United States for sale in New York. Manaf repeatedly told the UC that Manaf had paid the Taliban in connection with the production of the ten-kilo shipment and reported that heavily armed members of the Taliban would guard and transport future heroin shipments for Manaf and the UC. In August 2018, Manaf facilitated the transfer of thousands of dollars of what he believed to be narcotics proceeds through his money-remitting business to individuals Manaf had been advised were members of the Haqqani Network. Manaf subsequently agreed to supply the UC with thousand-kilogram loads of heroin for importation into the United States.

Following his arrest overseas and subsequent extradition, while incarcerated in New York pending trial in this case, Manaf directed members of his family in Afghanistan to kidnap and threaten a DEA source — a witness to his crimes — in an effort to silence him. Specifically, in a series of recorded prison calls in February and March 2019, Manaf directed his brothers to bring the source to Manaf’s family home, to “not let him go even for a minute,” to take the source’s phone, and to hand the source over to a “security chief” who would make the source “confess like a parrot” and “tell the whole story in two minutes.” Manaf’s brothers did just as he directed — they kidnapped that DEA source at gunpoint in Afghanistan and threatened to kill him.

In addition to the prison term, Manaf was sentenced to five years of supervised release and ordered to forfeit the proceeds of his crimes.

The DEA Special Operations Division’s Bilateral Investigations Unit; the DEA European Regional Director; the DEA Copenhagen, Canberra, Dubai, Islamabad, Kabul, New Delhi, and Sydney Country Offices; the Government of Estonia; and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission investigated the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sam Adelsberg, Nicholas S. Bradley, and Kimberly J. Ravener for the Southern District of New York are prosecuting the case with assistance from Trial Attorney Joshua Champagne of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section.

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Defense News: The U.S. Navy’s Cybersecurity Program Office (PMW 130) Leads the Charge in Implementing Zero Trust Architecture in Unmanned Systems

Source: United States Navy

The U.S. Navy’s Cybersecurity Office, Program Management Warfare (PMW) 130, worked alongside the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Program Executive Office for Digital and Enterprise Services, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific, Naval Sea Systems Command, and the Department of Defense Chief Information Office, to support 760/406 Unmanned Surface Vessel Squadron (USVRON) One in being the tip of the spear on leading achievement of zero trust control afloat small form factor and remote cyber operations. Dr. Scott Jasper, Principal Investigator, highlighted that Trident Warrior 24 provided the opportunity for NPS students to conduct applied research in the operating environment.

“The achievement of a ZTA in Trident Warrior 24 was important to demonstrate the viability of the selected cyber defense solutions,” said Dr. Jasper.

Zero trust, a security model that operates on the principle of “never trust, always verify,” mandates rigorous identity verification and continuous validation of every entity accessing a system. Unlike traditional security models that rely on perimeter defenses, ZTA assumes that threats can originate from both outside and inside the network, necessitating constant vigilance.

The adoption of zero trust in unmanned systems addresses several critical vulnerabilities. With the growing reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, delivery, and monitoring, ensuring the integrity and security of these systems is paramount. Zero trust ensures that every access request to the system, whether from an operator, sensor, or data feed, is authenticated, authorized, and encrypted.

The integration of ZTA in unmanned systems also offers significant benefits for military applications. The defense sector, which increasingly relies on autonomous systems for reconnaissance and combat operations, stands to gain from the enhanced security that zero trust provides. Ensuring that only verified and authorized entities can access or control these systems is crucial for maintaining operational security and mission success.

However, the transition to zero trust is not without challenges. Implementing ZTA requires significant changes to existing information technology infrastructure and ongoing management to maintain its effectiveness. Organizations must invest in robust identity and access management solutions, continuous monitoring systems, and training for personnel to adapt to this new security paradigm.

“Collaboration amongst Navy commands and industry partners, Microsoft and Dell, in Trident Warrior 24 was paramount in overcoming these technical challenges,” said Dr. Jasper.

Despite these hurdles, the consensus among experts is clear: the benefits of zero trust far outweigh the costs. As unmanned systems continue to evolve and their applications expand, ensuring their security through ZTA will be critical in protecting sensitive data, maintaining operational integrity, and fostering trust in these innovative technologies.

With cyber threats becoming more sophisticated and pervasive, the move toward zero trust represents a proactive and necessary step in the evolution of cybersecurity for unmanned systems. As the industry continues to embrace this model, the future of unmanned operations looks to be more secure and resilient than ever before.
PMW 130 is the Navy’s cybersecurity acquisition agent delivering cybersecurity products, capabilities, and services that protect and defend against cyber threats. The mission of PMW 130 is to enable information warfare by providing confidentiality, integrity, and availability of capabilities through innovative acquisition of maritime cybersecurity products.

Trident Warrior is an annual large-scale, at-sea field experiment where the Navy selects potential initiatives that address capability gaps and provide inventive solutions in an operational environment. Fleet experimentation allows the Navy and its partners to incorporate real-world warfighter feedback early in the acquisition process by exposing the fleet to emerging capabilities.