Nicholas Dimos Named Assistant Director of the Finance and Facilities Division

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Director Christopher Wray has named Nicholas Dimos as the assistant director of the Finance and Facilities Division (FFD) at FBI Headquarters in Washington. Mr. Dimos most recently served as the deputy assistant director of the division.

As assistant director of FFD, Mr. Dimos is responsible for overseeing the FBI’s finances, facilities, and logistics functions and serves as the chief financial officer, head of contracting activity, and real property officer.

Mr. Dimos joined the FBI in 2006 as a budget analyst in the Finance Division. In 2009, Mr. Dimos was promoted to a team leader in the Budget Formulation and Presentation Unit, where he oversaw budget development across several areas.

In 2012, he served as an acting supervisor and transition leader during the establishment of a new procurement unit that focused on strategic sourcing, complex contracting, and workforce development. In 2013, he transferred to the development team of the Bureau’s new financial system, which Mr. Dimos helped implement across the entire FBI.

Mr. Dimos was named the national intelligence financial manager in 2014 and served as the FBI’s senior financial liaison with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress on national intelligence financial matters.

He was promoted in 2015 to assistant section chief of the recently unified Finance and Facilities Division, overseeing budget formulation, execution, and reporting across all FBI funding sources.

In 2017, Mr. Dimos was appointed as the deputy assistant director of FFD, serving as the FBI’s deputy chief financial officer. He was responsible for budget, procurement, accounting, and audit functions, and led several initiatives to modernize financial services. Mr. Dimos also stood up the new procurement and budget operations at the FBI’s new campus in Huntsville, Alabama.

Before he joined the FBI, Mr. Dimos was a middle school science teacher in Philadelphia through Teach for America. He earned a degree in economics from DePauw University in Indiana and a graduate degree in security studies from Georgetown University.

Remarks by Director Christopher Wray to Anti-Defamation League on Hostage Incident in Colleyville, Texas

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Remarks as delivered.

Thank you, Jonathan. And thank you for that kind introduction. It’s great to see you again, even if only virtually.

We are all, needless to say, extremely grateful that things ended peacefully Saturday night and that Rabbi Cytron-Walker and the other three hostages were not physically harmed.

We’re also, of course, thankful for, and want to recognize, the hundreds of law enforcement personnel, as you said, across the state of Texas and elsewhere for their hard work and perseverance.

It was, in my view, really, the strength of these partnerships—federal, state, local, and community—and the ability to share information in real time, along with some awfully quick thinking and brave action, that helped end Saturday’s hostage situation with no victims’ lives lost.

That said, we understand all too well that these kinds of attacks are terrifying. And that they’re not only terrifying to the individuals directly and physically involved, they’re also terrifying to all the members of Congregation Beth Israel and really to the entire Jewish community, many of whom understandably worry about other threats still out there.

And while there are a lot of unknowns, in terms of details, in this particular matter that we’re drilling into, you can be confident that we at the FBI are committed to thoroughly and aggressively and rigorously investigating Saturday’s attack.

We also have and had victim specialists who were engaged with members of Congregation Beth Israel from the beginning of this horrific incident to offer any assistance they could.

Now let me be clear and blunt, the FBI is, and has been, treating Saturday’s events as an act of terrorism targeting the Jewish community. Within a matter of hours, we deployed FBI SWAT, two highly trained units from our elite Hostage Rescue Team; those are the folks who ultimately were the ones who went into the synagogue, along with canines.

We had our crisis negotiation unit. We had one of our folks on the phone with the hostage taker for hours and hours, and that turned out to be pretty important.

We had our crisis management unit, our counter-IED unit. You may remember that for a good part of Saturday we were concerned that the suspect had one or more bombs in his possession.

So those folks and others, there were a total of about 60 flown in quickly from our Critical Incident Response Group in Quantico, on the ground working with our terrific partners in state and local law enforcement to bring the situation to a safe resolution for the hostages.

And we are not finished.

Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces all across the country will continue to investigate why this individual specifically targeted Congregation Beth Israel on their day of worship.

The FBI Lab is actively processing evidence related to the events. Our Operational Technology Division is analyzing and reviewing phones and other electronic devices and media. And there’s a lot more work to be done, and we’re committed to seeing this all the way through.

This was not some random occurrence. It was intentional; it was symbolic, and we’re not going to tolerate anti-Semitism in this country.

We recognize that the Jewish community, in particular, has suffered violence and faces very real threats from really across the hate spectrum.

Homegrown violent extremists, radicalized by Jihadist movements online, foreign terrorists organizations like ISIS and Hezbollah, state-sponsored groups like the IRGC from Iran, and of course, domestic violent extremists, especially racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists.

All of them have expressed an intent and acted to do harm to the Jewish community, both here at home and abroad. And it’s because of that that we consider the enduring threats to the Jewish community to be among our very highest priorities.

No member of a faith-based community should have to worry about acts of violence at their services.

To be targeted at your place of worship, a space meant to be a sanctuary in every sense of the word, is, in my view, one of the most heinous acts of violence that can be committed.

And unfortunately, we’ve seen these types of attacks play out far, far too often at synagogues and other houses of worship across the country.

It’s why I have, for some time now, set the expectation that leadership in all 56 of the FBI’s field office should be working in their areas with faith communities to build trusted relationships, to maintain open dialogue, and share information with the folks who need it most. And it’s imperative that we establish and build those relationships before a crisis strikes.

As the situation last weekend showed, it’s those partnerships, training, awareness, and preparation that can make all the difference.

You know there’s a saying that the best time to patch the roof is when the sun is shining, before the storm.

And we don’t want to be meeting for the first time in the wake of a tragedy. So, I encourage all of you to be continuing to educate yourselves and each other and your members about how to recognize suspicious activity and to be ready and willing to report it.

In the meantime, we’re going to keep digging to get more answers for Congregation Beth Israel, for the Colleyville community, and for the Jewish community as a whole. I know it’s disheartening to see that these kinds of attacks continue to happen and that there are people out there who target members of the Jewish faith.

But you can be confident that we in the FBI stand with you. And it is my hope that you will continue to see us as a trusted partner and as a valued resource, as we work together in our collective fight against violent extremism.

We are committed to working with the ADL, listening to your concerns, and doing everything we can to help and protect the Jewish community.

So thank you, Jonathan, and thank you to the ADL for your partnership.

The Domestic Terrorism Threat One Year After January 6

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Joint Statement by FBI National Security Branch Executive Assistant Director Jill Sanborn and Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen Before the Senate Judiciary Committee

Washington, D.C.

Good morning Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Grassley, and distinguished members of the committee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of Justice. Protecting the American people from national security threats, including international and domestic terrorism, is the top priority of the department.

The threat posed by domestic violent extremism and hate crimes is on the rise in recent years, as evidenced by the horrific attacks in Pittsburgh, El Paso, and Charlottesville, and many other plots or threats that have been disrupted. The number of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigations of suspected domestic violent extremists has more than doubled since the spring of 2020. Last week marked the one-year anniversary of the January 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol, which has led to unprecedented efforts by the Department of Justice, including the FBI, to investigate and hold accountable all who engaged in violence, destruction of property, and other criminal activity on that day. To date, the department has arrested and charged more than 725 individuals who took part in the Capitol assault.

Federal law enforcement and the intelligence community assess that the greatest terrorism threat to our country is posed by lone actors or small cells who typically radicalize online and look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. We see these threats manifested in both domestic violent extremists (DVEs) and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), two distinct threats—both of which are based in the United States. Individuals who seek to commit violent criminal acts in furtherance of social or political goals stemming from domestic influences—such as racial or ethnic bias or anti-government or anti-authority sentiments—are described as DVEs, whereas HVEs are individuals inspired primarily by foreign terrorist groups, but who are not receiving individualized direction from those groups.

Today’s hearing is focused on domestic terrorism. Domestic violent extremists are often motivated by a mix of socio-political, ideological, and personal grievances, and have focused on readily accessible targets to include houses of worship, retail establishments, and mass public gatherings. The vulnerability of these targets, the insular nature of the process by which these individuals radicalize and mobilize to violence, and the limited communications they typically have with others regarding their plans pose significant challenges to law enforcement in its efforts to detect and disrupt these plots before they are carried out.

We face threats from DVEs that espouse a range of ideologies. Some are motivated by racial or ethnic animus. Others hold anti-government or anti-authority views. The FBI uses several categories for DVEs, including racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists (AGAAVEs)—which include militia violent extremists (MVEs) and anarchist violent extremists (AVEs). RMVEs who advocate for the superiority of the white race were the primary source of lethal attacks perpetrated by DVEs in 2018 and 2019. MVEs and AVEs were responsible for three of the four lethal DVE attacks in 2020. AAGVEs have specifically targeted law enforcement and the military as well as institutions or members of the U.S. government.

The Department of Justice uses all the tools at its disposal to combat domestic terrorism. Our efforts represent a critical part of the first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which was released in June 2021, and which sets forth for the first time a comprehensive, whole-of-government policy to address the many facets of the domestic terrorism threat. Our testimony today will focus first on how we are organized to handle domestic terrorism cases. We will then describe the legal authorities we rely on in investigating and prosecuting domestic terrorism. Finally, we will discuss some of the concrete steps we have taken to implement the national strategy.

I.

The Department of Justice uses all of its authorities—including those exercised by the FBI, the U.S. attorney’s offices, the National Security Division, the Civil Rights Division, the Tax Division, the Criminal Division, and other components—to take a whole-of-department approach to combating domestic terrorism.

On the front lines of our efforts to investigate and prosecute domestic and international terrorism are the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and the department’s 94 U.S. attorney’s offices. JTTFs provide an essential hub for cooperating on both international and domestic terrorism matters across all levels of government nationwide. The FBI has established JTTFs across all 56 FBI field offices, which leverage enduring partnerships with federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to detect, identify, and disrupt terrorist threats. Each U.S. attorney’s office also coordinates a group of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials in each district, referred to as an Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC). The ATACs work in close partnership with corresponding JTTFs to promote training and information sharing among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners in both international and domestic terrorism matters. This training and information sharing is critical because there are many more state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement officers on the ground than there are federal agents, and they may be the first to come across individuals planning terrorist acts within their communities. Federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial officials often evaluate these threats together, including assessing whether federal or state charges are available to disrupt them, with the goal of preventing terrorist attacks before they occur. Each U.S. attorney’s office has also designated a senior prosecutor to serve as a national security/ATAC coordinator. The national security/ATAC coordinator serves as the lead counterterrorism prosecutor for the district, as well as the primary point of contact for the department on terrorism matters. Many U.S. attorney’s offices also have designated national security sections or units within the office that are specifically focused on counterterrorism and other national security matters. The national security/ATAC coordinator and other national security prosecutors in the U.S. attorney’s offices are specially trained in domestic and international terrorism matters and work closely with the JTTFs to investigate and prosecute terrorism matters.

At Main Justice here in Washington, the National Security Division (NSD) was created in 2006 to integrate, coordinate, and advance the department’s counterterrorism and other national security work nationwide. NSD has a Counterterrorism Section (CTS) with more than 35 attorneys, all of whom are equipped to work on both domestic and international terrorism cases in concert with U.S. attorney’s offices. CTS regularly coordinates with the FBI’s Domestic Terrorism Operations Section. CTS is fully integrated with the U.S. attorney’s offices around the country for purposes of all terrorism matters. NSD attorneys serve as important resources and partners in litigating legal issues and can also participate actively as co-prosecutors. Among the cadre of CTS attorneys who work on counterterrorism cases are a number of attorneys referred to as domestic terrorism coordinators who have particular expertise regarding, and assist other federal prosecutors with, certain recurring issues in domestic terrorism-related matters. Also within CTS, there is a Domestic Terrorism Counsel who, among other things, assists NSD’s headquarters-level efforts to identify trends to help shape our strategy to combat domestic terrorism and domestic violent extremism.

At FBI Headquarters, the National Security Branch (NSB) was established in 2005, combining counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigative and intelligence programs into a singular, unified organizational structure. Today, NSB is principally comprised of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Division, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, and the interagency Terrorist Screening Center. The Counterterrorism Division, through its Domestic Terrorism Operations Section, provides guidance and coordination among the FBI’s 56 field offices on matters of domestic terrorism as well as maintaining close relationships with law enforcement partners both inside and outside the Department of Justice to ensure a cohesive and uniform approach to all domestic terrorism investigations.

Other Department of Justice components fulfill a critical role in countering domestic terrorism:

  • The Civil Rights Division is responsible for overseeing the prosecution of hate crimes, certain of which, as described in more detail below, may also qualify as acts of domestic terrorism.
  • Some anti-government violent extremists who are engaged in domestic terrorism refuse to pay taxes, and the Tax Division is responsible for overseeing prosecution of tax offenses committed by such individuals.
  • The Criminal Division also plays a vital role in some domestic terrorism prosecutions.
  • The department’s grant-making components also support programs aimed at preventing terrorist incidents. For example, the Bureau of Justice Assistance within the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) supports the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program. That program provides instruction that focuses on the prevention of terrorism within the United States and provides the tools necessary for state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement officers to understand, detect, deter, and investigate acts of terrorism and violent criminal extremism in the U.S. The program accomplishes this in partnership with the FBI, fusion centers, local intelligence centers, and U.S. attorney’s offices. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the program currently is providing online training, a secure website for law enforcement specific training, and customizable technical assistance to law enforcement officers and members of the intelligence community. The program also provides a “Train the Trainer” course that helps law enforcement agencies develop in-house anti-terrorism training capabilities. Additionally, for nearly a decade, OJP’s research component, the National Institute of Justice, has administered a domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism research program to inform terrorism prevention efforts (principally at the state and local level), such as those aimed to prevent the recidivism of those convicted of terrorism related offenses.
  • The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) also plays a vital role in investigating violations of the federal firearms and explosives laws, among other potential acts of terrorism. Together with the FBI, ATF also jointly manages the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, the single interagency organization that analyzes all terrorist improvised explosive devices of interest to the United States.

II.

A.

The federal criminal code provides a definition of “domestic terrorism” (see 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)) that covers activities that—

  1. involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
  2. appear to be intended—
  1. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
  2. to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
  3. to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

   C. occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States[.]

Where incorporated into other authorities, this definition provides us with an array of expanded investigative tools and sentencing enhancements in domestic terrorism matters:

  • Judges can issue nationwide search warrants in cases involving domestic terrorism, just as they are authorized to do in cases involving international terrorism. Typically, judges can only issue warrants pertaining to their districts. This expanded authority reduces delays and burdens on investigations with regional or national scope. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(3).
  • Judges may grant orders giving investigators greater access to certain educational and taxpayer records in domestic and international terrorism investigations. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(j)(1)(A), 9573(e); 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(7)(C).
  • Investigative and law enforcement officers have additional authority to share intercepted communications and derivative evidence, including with appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign officials, when disclosing information revealing a threat of terrorism, including domestic terrorism. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(8).
  • Government attorneys also have additional authority to share grand jury matter, including with appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign officials, when disclosing information to prevent or respond to a threat of terrorism, including domestic terrorism. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
  • Some statutes, particularly ones relating to conduct that impedes our investigations, carry enhanced statutory maximums if the offense involves or is intended to facilitate domestic or international terrorism. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (material false statements); id. § 1505 (obstruction of justice); id. § 1028 (fraudulent identification); cf. id. § 226 (including definition within an element of the offense for bribery affecting port security).

In addition, the federal criminal code contains a definition of “federal crime of terrorism,” to mean an offense that “is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,” and violates one of the enumerated statutes prohibiting terrorism-related offenses, such as statutes related to weapons of mass destruction. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). That definition includes both domestic and international terrorism, and it provides enhanced authority with respect to investigations, detention, sentencing, and supervised release:

  • Congress has extended the statute of limitations, id. § 3286, and created a rebuttable presumption of pretrial detention for the offenses listed in the definition of “federal crime of terrorism,” id. § 3142(e)(3), better empowering the government to protect the public and hold individuals accountable for those criminal activities.
  • Any act that is indictable under any provision listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) is also defined as a type of racketeering activity subject to potential prosecution under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
  • The sentencing guidelines provide a significant sentencing enhancement for offenses that involve, or are intended to promote, a “federal crime of terrorism”—often increasing the guideline range to the statutory maximum. See USSG § 3A1.4.
  • The sentencing guidelines also provide for a similar upward departure for other offenses that were calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, to retaliate against government conduct, or to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. See id. cmt. n.4.
  • Congress has also authorized lifetime supervised release for the offenses listed in the definition of “federal crime of terrorism,” see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(j), which helps to prevent recidivism.

B.

The Department of Justice has prosecuted individuals whose conduct involves domestic terrorism or a threat thereof using a range of criminal statutes. These include weapons charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924; charges relating to use or possession of explosives, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845, 5861; threat, hoax, or riot charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 871, 875, 876, 1038, 2101; and charges proscribing attacks on federal officials or facilities, e.g., id. §§ 111, 115, 351, 844, 930, 1114, 1361, 1751. Arson, id. § 844, or specific charges relating to violence against animal enterprises, id. § 43, may apply to animal rights or environmental violent extremists. Moreover, several statutes reach conduct that may be associated with terrorism, without regard to whether the offense itself involves domestic or international terrorism. These include statutes relating to aircraft sabotage, 18 U.S.C. § 32; weapons of mass destruction, e.g., id. §§ 175, 175b, 175c, 229, 831, 832, 2332a, 2332h, 2332i; arson and bombing of federal property, e.g., id. §§ 844, 2332a, 2332f; and causing injury or death to a federal official, e.g. id. §§ 111, 115, 351, 1114, 1751; among others. And it is a crime to provide material support or resources to another knowing or intending that they be used in preparation for or carrying out certain terrorism-related offenses. Id. § 2339A.

Hate crimes charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 245, 247, 249, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, may also be appropriate to address incidents of domestic terrorism. A hate crime occurs where an attacker engages in criminal violence motivated by a person’s actual or perceived characteristics, such as race, color, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability. A hate crime that is also designed to coerce a civilian population or influence the policy of a government in furtherance of a socio-political goal may also qualify as domestic terrorism. In 2019, the FBI created a Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell to facilitate coordination and information-sharing between agents and prosecutors specifically regarding incidents and investigations that could constitute hate crimes and/or acts of domestic terrorism. This fusion cell provides multi-program coordination, helps ensure seamless information sharing, and enhances investigative resources to combat the domestic terrorism threat.

We also work closely with our state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to confront domestic terrorism. Some cases involving suspected domestic violent extremists do not involve violations of federal law and are instead prosecuted by state and local authorities under state law. Other cases may involve violations of both federal law and state law, and the state charge, in some circumstances, may be the most effective way to prosecute an individual. In those circumstances, we support our state, local, tribal, and territorial partners in any way we can.

It is important to emphasize that we investigate and prosecute domestic violent extremists for their criminal acts, not for their beliefs or based on their associations. In fighting domestic terrorism, we respect the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, association, and assembly of all Americans. We open cases based on suspected criminal violations, not ideologies, and hold sacred the rights of individuals to peacefully exercise their First Amendment freedoms. The FBI may not and does not open investigations solely on the basis of First Amendment-protected activity.

III.

The department’s efforts to combat domestic terrorism are a key component of the recently released National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. The national strategy adopts a whole-of-government approach to preventing domestic terrorism and reducing the factors that fuel it. The national strategy recognizes that, to find sustainable solutions, we must not only disrupt and deter terrorist activities, but also address the root causes of violence. It rests on four essential pillars: (1) understanding and sharing domestic terrorism-related information; (2) preventing recruitment and mobilization to violence; (3) disrupting and deterring domestic terrorism activity; and (4) confronting long-term contributors to this problem. The national strategy emphasizes that activity protected under the First Amendment, including speech espousing an extremist ideology, is not unlawful and that any steps to counter domestic terrorism must therefore be focused on acts or true threats of violence, so as to safeguard Americans’ civil rights and civil liberties. We have already taken concrete steps to implement the national strategy:

  • The department has issued binding guidance to ensure that investigations and prosecutions with a nexus to domestic violent extremism are reported to the National Security Division for better tracking and to ensure coordination and consistency across the department in the handling of those matters.
  • The department, through the FBI, has increased collaboration and information sharing with law enforcement and private sector partners, including regular engagement with the technology sector to share developments on counterterrorism threat streams and with partners in the finance, retail, trucking, and shipping sectors to provide information to those organizations including threat indicators, legal and policy challenges, and case studies of productive partnerships.
  • The department’s Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee (DTEC) provides a national-level forum for information sharing at the leadership level on domestic terrorism matters. Originally created in the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the DTEC includes representatives from the U.S. attorney’s offices, the National Security Division, other divisions of Main Justice, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and other law enforcement agencies.
  • The department’s grant-making components are dedicating additional resources to helping states, localities, and others focus on the domestic terrorism threat. These efforts have included: adding hate crimes and domestic violent extremism as areas of special consideration in Community Policing Development Microgrants Programs, which fund the development of community policing strategies; revitalizing the curriculum of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program to enhance terrorism related training; and funding research to improve our understanding of the process of radicalizing to terrorism, reintegration of offenders incarcerated for terrorism-related offenses, and terrorism prevention programs. Further resources include toolkits and training and technical assistance to communities who support domestic terrorism victims through augmented emergency planning or responses to these events and grants to help these victims in the aftermath of incidents.
  • The department has also recently announced several initiatives aimed at preventing or more effectively responding to hate crimes, some of which also qualify as acts of domestic terrorism. For example, the Attorney General has appointed a hate crimes coordinator to centralize the department’s efforts to combat hate crimes; the FBI has launched a National Anti-Hate Crimes Campaign involving all 56 FBI field offices to encourage reporting of hate crimes and hate incidents; and through its Criminal Investigative Division, the FBI has recently elevated hate crimes and criminal civil rights violations to its highest-level national threat priority, which increases resources for hate crimes prevention and investigations and makes hate crimes a focus for all of the FBI’s field offices.

* * *

In all our efforts, the Justice Department is guided by our commitment to protecting civil liberties. In our country, espousing an extremist ideology is not itself a crime. Nor is expressing hateful views or associating with hateful groups. But when individuals or groups try to promote or impose an ideology through acts or threats of force or violence, those acts can be among the most dangerous crimes we confront as a society. Regardless of the motivating ideology, we will use every appropriate tool at our disposal to deter and disrupt such acts and to bring their perpetrators to justice.

We appreciate the opportunity to discuss these issues with you, and we would be pleased to answer your questions.

FBI Offers Officer Safety Awareness Training

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Officer Safety Awareness Training works to prevent deaths and serious injuries by helping law enforcement identify areas to supplement current training. The training is free for the FBI’s law enforcement partners.

Some of the topics covered include:

  • Traffic stops
  • Foot pursuits
  • Arrest situations
  • Ambushes and unprovoked attacks
  • Officer and offender perceptions

To request in-person or virtual training, email osat@fbi.gov or sign up through the FBI’s Virtual Academy for Law Enforcement.

Justice as a Relay Race: Continuing to Fight for the Victims of Pan Am Flight 103

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News

Ceremony Marking the 33rd Anniversary of the Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Arlington National Cemetery

Thank you all. It is a privilege to join you here this afternoon.

Arlington Cemetery is, of course, one of our nation’s most sacred and solemn grounds.

As the world changes and turns, these rolling green hills and rows of white markers stand as an unbroken, unchanging constant.

Once a year, every year, there is a tradition that carries on. We all noticed the wreaths that were laid at each headstone this past weekend. Some of the wreaths were laid by families of the service members and veterans who rest here. And two weekends ago, those families spent time by themselves at the gravesites while laying their wreaths.

Then, this past Saturday, the area was filled with volunteers carrying wreaths and laying them at each headstone. As they lay the wreath, the volunteers say the name of each veteran out loud. Saying each name aloud is a way of expressing remembrance of each and every individual hero who served and sacrificed. This enduring tradition ensures that no one who has been laid to rest here will ever be forgotten.

Likewise, that’s why it is so critically important that we say the names of every individual lost in Lockerbie on this day in 1988 and remember them for eternity.

It’s essential that we read those names aloud every year, because it’s one thing to talk about this horrific act as one of the worst terrorist attacks in history. And it’s another thing entirely to remember each life lost, and each family member and loved one affected by those losses.

That makes it real. And it makes it personal.

The FBI, driven by the lives and the memories of those we honor and remember here today, has never stopped taking what happened on December 21, 1988, personally.

Since that dark evening in Scotland 33 years ago, FBI personnel have traveled to at least 16 countries in furtherance of this investigation. Hundreds and hundreds of individuals have been interviewed. Thousands of leads have been pursued and covered. Countless hours have been spent reviewing volumes and volumes of evidence.

When the Libyan government fell, the opportunity to find new evidence presented itself, and investigative efforts led to the U.S. bringing charges last year against the man who built the bomb that brought the plane down.

This is a most important reflection of our absolute commitment to seeking and obtaining justice and supporting the prosecution team in their work to obtain custody and prosecute this subject and others ultimately here in the United States.

And we will never stop our work until every individual responsible for this evil act is held accountable under our law.

One of our colleagues has described it this way:

“These cases are not sprints or marathons, but are more like relay races. Every person who is a part of this kind of case knows they owe it to the victims and the families who loved them to run as hard as they can until they hand off the baton.”

The investigation of Pan Am 103 is a race we’re still running, and we will never, ever stop until justice is attained fully and completely.

We are grateful and thankful to all the dedicated FBI personnel who’ve carried the baton, and who continue to run the race.

For the FBI, this has involved far more than just investigating the bombing.

As many of you know, the decades-long walk alongside you, the relentless quest for justice, has changed who we are as an organization and how we serve people.

Working with you has driven a profound change in the way we help and support victims of crime and terrorism.

At the time of the bombing, helping federal crime victims in any way at all was a relatively new concept.

When the first two suspects in this case were put on trial 20 years ago, the head of DOJ’s Office for Victims of Crime, Kathryn Turman, was tasked with creating a plan to support the victims’ families during that trial. That plan changed how our government relates to victims of terrorism and other federal crimes.

The next year, in 2001, Director Mueller asked Kathryn to lead a new victim assistance office at the FBI. That office eventually became what is now our Victim Services Division, which Kathryn led until her retirement last year.

And as she noted, “So much of what we ended up doing for 9/11 families and others has come from lessons learned from the Pan Am 103 families.”

So, I want to thank you for what you’ve done in this regard to move the Bureau forward.

The support, assistance, comfort, and transparency we’ve worked to more fully provide to victims and families is guided by you, always.

For 33 years, you’ve shown us what commitment and perseverance look like. You’ve pushed for improvements in aviation security, and for our government to understand the lasting damage and danger of terrorism. You’ve changed the way our government treats victims of terrorism and their loved ones. You’ve stood by other families who have lost loved ones to terrorism, and, most importantly, you’ve stood together in the face of unimaginable heartbreak and loss.

We are here today—in this place our nation set aside for remembering those we’ve lost—to thank you for your endless strength and support.

And to let you know that the FBI will never forget you or your loved ones—the real people behind the names—nor ever give up working tirelessly to achieve justice for each and every soul, and for each of you.

Thank you and God bless you all.