Category: MIL-OSI

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

The FBI Memphis Field Office, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Secret Service—Nashville Field Office are warning potential victims of a rise in money mule schemes.

Acting as a money mule—allowing others to use your bank account, or conducting financial transactions on behalf of others jeopardizes your financial security and compromises your personally identifiable information. Protect yourself by refusing to send or receive money on behalf of individuals and businesses for which you are not personally and professionally responsible.

Signs You May Be Acting as a Money Mule

• You receive an unsolicited email or contact over social media promising easy money for little to no effort.
• The “employer” you communicate with uses web-based email (such as Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, or Outlook).
• You are asked to open up a bank account in your own name or in the name of a company you form to receive and transfer money.
• As an employee, you are asked to receive funds in your bank account and then “process funds” or “transfer funds” via a wire transfer, ACH, mail, or money service business (such as Western Union or MoneyGram).
• You are allowed to keep a portion of the money you transfer.
• Your duties have no specific job description.
• Your online companion, whom you have never met in person, asks you to conduct financial transactions that they should reasonably be able to do for themselves, and offers to share the proceeds of that transaction with you.
• Your online companion is adamant that you keep the relationship and the associated financial transactions secret.

How to Protect Yourself

• Do not accept any job offers that ask you to use your own bank account to transfer their money. A legitimate company will not ask you to do this.
• Be wary when an employer asks you to form a company to open up a new bank account.
• Never give your financial details to someone you don’t know and trust, especially if you met them online.
• Be wary when job advertisements are poorly written with grammatical errors and spelling mistakes.
• Be suspicious when the individual you met on a dating website wants to use your bank account for receiving and forwarding money.
• Perform online searches to check the information from any solicitation emails and contacts.
• Ask the employer, “Can you send a copy of the license/permit to conduct business in my county or state?”
• Utilize the privacy settings on your social media, and be selective about the information you make public.
• If you are unsure whether or not you are being used as a money mule and you are uncomfortable talking to law enforcement, consult with your local bank branch.

How to Respond

• If you have received solicitations of this type, do not respond to them and do not click on any links they contain. Inform your local police, FBI, TBI, or the U.S. Secret Service.
• If you believe that you are participating in a money mule scheme, stop transferring money immediately and notify your bank, the service you used to conduct the transaction, and law enforcement.

If you believe you, or someone you know, has been solicited to be a money mule, please contact the FBI Memphis Field Office at 901-747-4300, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation at TipsToTBI@tn.gov, or the U.S. Secret Service—Nashville Field Office at 615-736-5841. To report suspicious activity, please visit the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov.

Learn more about money mules and help raise awareness by sharing the facts through #DontBeAMule.

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

Director Christopher Wray has named Susan Ferensic as the special agent in charge of the Columbia Field Office in South Carolina. Most recently, Ms. Ferensic served as the chief of staff for the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services (CCRS) Branch at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

Ms. Ferensic began her career with the FBI examining digital evidence as a computer forensic examiner in the Laboratory Division in 1997. She was selected as a special agent in 2000 and upon graduation from the FBI Academy was assigned criminal and national security computer intrusion matters in the Washington Field Office.

In 2007, Ms. Ferensic was promoted to supervisory special agent in the Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters, serving as a program manager for criminal computer intrusion investigations. She transferred to the Albuquerque Field Office in New Mexico in 2009 to lead the cyber and technically trained agent squad. She also served as the supervisory special agent of Albuquerque’s Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Ms. Ferensic was promoted in 2014 to special assistant to the executive assistant director of the Science and Technology Branch at FBI Headquarters, advising the EAD on broad program management and administrative matters. In 2016, she was promoted to assistant special agent in charge of the Criminal Branch of the Sacramento Field Office in California.

She was named section chief of the Digital Forensics and Analytics Section in the Operational Technology Division at FBI Headquarters in 2018. In 2019, she was promoted to chief of staff of the CCRS Branch.

Ms. Ferensic earned a bachelor’s degree in mathematics from the University of Maryland. Prior to working at the FBI, she was a computer scientist at the Department of Defense.

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

False Claims of Hacked Voter Information Likely Intended to Cast Doubt on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are issuing this announcement to raise awareness of the potential threat posed by attempts to spread disinformation regarding cyberattacks on U.S. voter registration databases or voting systems.

During the 2020 election season, foreign actors and cyber criminals are spreading false and inconsistent information through various online platforms in an attempt to manipulate public opinion, discredit the electoral process, and undermine confidence in U.S. democratic institutions. These malicious actors could use these forums to also spread disinformation suggesting successful cyber operations have compromised election infrastructure and facilitated the “hacking” and “leaking” of U.S. voter registration data.

In reality, much U.S. voter information can be purchased or acquired through publicly available sources. While cyber actors have in recent years obtained voter registration information, the acquisition of this data did not impact the voting process or the integrity of election results. In addition, the FBI and CISA have no information suggesting any cyberattack on U.S. election infrastructure has prevented an election from occurring, compromised the accuracy of voter registration information, prevented a registered voter from casting a ballot, or compromised the integrity of any ballots cast.

Recommendations

• Seek out information from trustworthy sources, verify who produced the content, and consider their intent.
• Rely on state and local election officials for information about voter registration databases and voting systems.
• View early, unverified claims with a healthy dose of skepticism.
• Verify through multiple reliable sources any reports about compromises of voter information or voting systems, and consider searching for other reliable sources before sharing such information via social media or other avenues.
• Report potential election crimes—such as disinformation about the manner, time, or place of voting—to the FBI.
• If appropriate, make use of in-platform tools offered by social media companies for reporting suspicious posts that appear to be spreading false or inconsistent information about voter information or voting systems.

The FBI and CISA coordinate closely with federal, state, and local election partners and provide services and information to safeguard U.S. voting processes and maintain the integrity of U.S. elections. Both organizations urge the American public to critically evaluate the sources of the information they consume and to seek out reliable and verified information.

The FBI is responsible for investigating malign foreign influence operations and malicious cyber activity targeting election infrastructure and other U.S. democratic institutions. CISA is responsible for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats and has provided voluntary guidance, training, exercises, and other resources to help state and local election officials secure their voter registration systems and data.

Victim Reporting and Additional Information

The FBI encourages the public to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local field office (www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices) or to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (www.ic3.gov). For additional assistance, best practices, and common terms, please visit the following websites:

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

Press release available in both English and Spanish.

SAN JUAN, PR—Special Agent in Charge Rafael A. Riviere Vázquez, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) San Juan Field Office, announced the arrests of Jonuel Ortiz-Nazario (Ortiz-Nazario), Elian Torres-Ortiz (Torres-Ortiz), and Omar Díaz-Vázquez (Díaz-Vázquez).

Ortiz-Nazario, Torres-Ortiz, and Díaz-Vázquez were charged under a complaint with violations of Title 18 United States Code, Section 2119 (Carjacking) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c) (Brandishing of a Firearm during the Commission of a Violent Crime) for separate events which took place in Corozal and Naranjito, during the month of January, 2021.

The subjects were arrested by FBI special agents of the Violent Crimes Squad of the FBI San Juan Field Office. Arrests took place on January 22, 2021, after subjects were detained by officers of the Police of Puerto Rico – CIC Vega Baja Precinct.

This case is being investigated by the FBI San Juan Field Office and is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Mark Chattah, District of Puerto Rico, from the Violent Crimes Section.

Tips and information assist the FBI and its federal, state, and local law enforcement partners. Citizens with information are asked to contact the FBI San Juan Field Office at 787-987-6500, or to submit tips through the FBI’s Internet complaint portal at Tips.FBI.Gov Tipsters can remain anonymous.

The public is reminded a complaint contains only charges and is not evidence of guilt. Defendants are presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty by a court of law. The U.S. government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

---

Arresto de Jonuel Ortiz-Nazario, Elian Torres-Ortiz and Omar Díaz-Vázquez

SAN JUAN, PR—El Agente Especial a Cargo Rafael A. Riviere Vázquez, de la Oficina de San Juan del Negociado Federal de Investigación (FBI, por sus siglas en inglés), anunció el arresto de Jonuel Ortiz-Nazario (Ortiz-Nazario), Elian Torres-Ortiz (Torres-Ortiz) y Omar Díaz-Vázquez (Díaz-Vázquez).

Ortiz-Nazario, Torres-Ortiz y Díaz-Vázquez fueron acusados mediante Querella por violaciones al Título 18 del Código de los Estados Unidos, Secciones 2119 (“carjacking”) y 924(c) (uso de un arma de fuego durante la comisión de un crimen violento) por eventos separados que ocurrieron en Corozal y Naranjito, Puerto Rico durante el mes de enero de 2021.

Los sujetos fueron arrestados por Agentes Especiales de la Escuadra de Crímenes Violentos de la Oficina de San Juan del FBI. El arresto se llevó a cabo el 22 de noviembre de 2021 luego de que los sujetos fueran detenidos por Agentes del CIC de Vega Baja de la Policía de Puerto Rico. 

El enjuiciamiento de este caso está a cargo del Fiscal Federal Mark Chattah, de la Sección de Crímenes Violentos y es investigado por la Oficina de San Juan del FBI. 

Las confidencias e información ayudan al FBI y a sus colegas federales, estatales y locales en el desempeño de sus funciones. Por ello, se le solicita al público que contacte a la Oficina de San Juan del FBI al 787-987-6500, o reporte confidencias a través de la línea de pistas (tips) del FBI, disponible en la página de internet Tips.FBI.Gov.

Los querellantes podrán permanecer anónimos.

Se le recuerda al público que una Querella sólo contiene cargos y no es evidencia de culpabilidad. Todo acusado se presume inocente hasta que se pruebe lo contrario más allá de toda duda razonable. El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos tiene el peso de la prueba.

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

SAN JUAN, PR—Special Agent in Charge Rafael A. Riviere Vázquez, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) San Juan Field Office, announced the arrest of Derek Muñoz González (Muñoz González).

Muñoz González was charged under a complaint with violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2251(a)—Sexual Exploitation of Minors—and 2252(a)(1)&(2)—Certain Activities Related to Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of Minors—for events which took place in Bayamón on January 2021.

Muñoz González was arrested by FBI special agents of the Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Force of the FBI San Juan Field Office. The arrest took place on January 13, 2021, after the subject shared multiple images online, which depicted sexual activity involving his 8-month-old daughter and a 15-year-old girl.

This case is being investigated by the FBI San Juan Field Office and is being prosecuted by the Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico, Nick Cannon.

Tips and information assist the FBI and its federal, state, and local law enforcement partners. Citizens with information are asked to contact the FBI San Juan Field Office at 787-987-6500, or to submit tips through the FBI’s Internet complaint portal at Tips.FBI.Gov Tipsters can remain anonymous.

The public is reminded a complaint contains only charges and is not evidence of guilt. Defendants are presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty by a court of law. The U.S. government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.